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I. INTRODUCTION 
When the United States government fails to implement and enforce a new 
regulatory scheme, the failure becomes engraved in the minds of the public and it 
can have catastrophic consequences.1 For example, the Affordable Health Care 
Act rollout is remembered for its unwanted complications, including website 
 
1. See generally OECD, REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE: CHALLENGES FOR REGULATORY 
COMPLIANCE (2000), available at http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/46466287.pdf [hereinafter 
REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that the success 
of a regulatory scheme largely depends on whether the group that is effected by the regulations have the ability 
to comply with the laws and whether the enforcement levels match the ultimate goals of the laws).   
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malfunctions, a delayed initiation date, and the shutdown of individual market 
plans.2 The Department of Homeland Security’s implementation of its National 
Response Plan proved to be a failure during Hurricane Katrina  due to a lack of 
communication, preparation, and coordination between state and federal 
responders.3  
The implementation phase of a new regulatory scheme is not the only factor 
that determines whether the scheme will be a success; it must also be managed 
and enforced.4 For example, between 2000 and 2008, existing economic 
regulatory agencies failed to manage risky financial lending practices that 
eventually snowballed into the Great Recession of 2008.5 These examples are 
extreme, but they depict what can happen if a regulation is designed, 
administered, or enforced incorrectly.6 
Since becoming the first state to legalize medical marijuana, California has 
struggled to create effective regulations to govern the commercial industry.7 For 
several years, Assembly Member Tom Ammiano proposed legislation for 
marijuana industry oversight, but each proposal failed.8 The state’s stalemate is 
due in part to law enforcement lobbyists derailing proposals for the commercial 
regulation of marijuana.9 In 2014, things changed when the California Police 
Chief’s Association and the League of California Cities sponsored a bill that 
would initiate a regulatory framework for the medical marijuana industry.10 SB 
 
2. Tom Cohen, Rough Obamacare Rollout: 4 Reasons Why, CNN (Oct. 23, 2013, 9:17 AM), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/10/22/politics/obamacare-website-four-reasons/ (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review).   
3. DONALD P. MOYNIHAN, THE RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA (2009), available at irgc.org/ 
Hurrican_Katrina_full_case (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
4. See REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE, supra note 1, at 20 (asserting that the failure to enforce 
leads to lack of compliance).  
5. The Origins of the Financial Crisis, Crash Course, ECONOMIST (Sept. 7, 2013), http://www.economist. 
com/news/schoolsbrief/21584534-effects-financial-crisis-are-still-being-felt-five-years-article (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review).  
6. See REDUCING THE RISK OF POLICY FAILURE, supra note 1, at 19–20, 22 (listing examples of 
ramifications that occur when “a rule that is on the books” is not enforced). 
7. See generally Assemb. B. 1894, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014); see also Assemb. B. 473, 2013 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (noting both bills were proposed by Assemblyman Ammiano as an attempt to 
regulate the marijuana industry and both subsequently failed).  
8. Assemb. B. 1894, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended on May 23, 2014, but not enacted); 
Assemb. B. 473, 2013 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended May 24, 2013, but not enacted); Assemb. B. 
2312, 2012 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2012) (as amended May 25, 2012, but not enacted); Assemb. B. 390, 2010 
Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2010) (as amended Jan. 4, 2010, but not enacted).  
9. See CAL. POLICE CHIEFS ASS’N,  SENATE BILL 1262 (CORREA) MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATION 
(2014), available at www.californiapolicechiefs.org/assets/sb-1262/1262%20fact%20sheet.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (discussing the inability to impose a decent regulatory scheme of medicinal marijuana 
since its use became legal in 2003).  
10. See Letter from California Police Chiefs Association, Senate Bill 1262 (Correa), to the Honorable Lou 
Correa, Member of the California Senate Regarding Senate Bill 1262 (Correa) (Feb. 24, 2014), available at 
www.cacities.org/Resources-Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/Hot-Issues/Marijuana-Policy/SB-1262-
Joint-Letter-to-Senj-Correa.aspx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining the need for marijuana 
industry regulation).   
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1262 stemmed from  the industry’s need for recognition of marijuana as a state 
approved medical treatment, guidance for law enforcement, oversight of 
physician’s marijuana recommendations to patients, and clarity regarding the 
risks the industry faces from the federal government.11 SB 1262 sought to satisfy 
these needs by implementing statewide regulations and limitations on businesses 
and physicians within the industry.12 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Marijuana has had a long and turbulent history throughout the United States, 
and California’s marijuana legislative history is no exception.13 While marijuana 
use is illegal under federal law,14 many states have chosen to permit its medical 
use, including California.15 After becoming the first state to allow medical 
marijuana, and without any regulatory framework to guide this growing 
enterprise, California became known as “the wild, wild west.”16  
Localities attempted to fill the gaps within the state’s marijuana regulations, 
leaving law enforcement and patients with a patchwork of rules to navigate.17 
This patchwork increased the tension between the conflicting laws of the federal 
and state government, and consequently the United States Department of Justice 
responded with a strict set of priorities.18 Although tension between state and 
federal preferences has not dissipated, many states continue to legalize and 
regulate the industry.19 
A. The Federal Government ‘Just Says No’ to Marijuana 
In 1970, Congress enacted the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) as a part of 
the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act.20 The CSA 
 
11. Press Release, Lou Correa, Sen., Cal. State S., Correa Medical Marijuana Legislation Clears 
Assembly Public Safety Committee (2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Assembly Member Correa, Medical 
Marijuana Legislation], available at http://sd34.senate.ca.gov/news/2014-06-26-correa-medical-marijuana-
legislation-clears-assembly-public-safety-committee (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
12. See generally S.B. 1262, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (as amended and corrected by Assemb. 
Comm. on Appropriations, Aug. 7, 2014) (creating licensing regulations for medical marijuana businesses and 
restricting physician recommendations of the drug).  
13. CAL. POLICE CHIEFS ASS’N, supra note 9. 
14. Infra Part II.A. 
15. Infra PartII.B.  
16. Jim Araby, California Legislators Should Lasso ‘Wild West’ of Medical Marijuana, SACRAMENTO 
BEE (Mar. 25, 2015, 5:00 PM), http://www.sacbee.com/opinion/op-ed/soapbox/article16312133.html (on file 
with the McGeorge Law Review).  
17. Infra Part II.C. 
18. Id.  
19. Infra Part II.D.  
20. Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1973 Pub. L. No. 91–513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970). 
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categorizes controlled substances into five schedules.21 Substances in Schedule I, 
like marijuana, are designated as having “no currently accepted medical use.”22 
As a result, it is illegal to use, possess, dispense, and manufacture marijuana 
under federal law, save for a few narrow exceptions.23 Shortly after the CSA’s 
enactment, the DEA received petitions to reclassify marijuana as a Schedule II 
drug,24 which would enable physicians to legally prescribe it.25 The federal 
government has denied every petition and marijuana use remains largely illegal 
under federal law.26 
B. California Stirs the Pot 
Despite federal law, Congress passed a statewide initiative known as the 
Compassionate Use Act (CUA) in 1996.27 The CUA exempts the following from 
criminal penalties: a patient’s use, possession, and cultivation of   marijuana; or a 
caregiver’s possession or cultivation of marijuana.28 To receive the exemption, a 
physician must give a written or oral recommendation for medical marijuana as 
an appropriate treatment.29 While the CUA authorizes patients to treat a wide 
array of illnesses with the drug,30 the provision does not allow for recreational use 
or sale.31 
The CUA generated significant confusion about who could lawfully use 
medical marijuana and who could not.32 In 2003, the California legislature 
enacted the Medical Marijuana Program Act (MMPA), which created a registry 
system that issues identification cards to “qualified patients” and their primary 
 
21. 21 U.S.C. § 812(a) (West 1970).  
22. Id. Other factors that contribute to placing a drug in Schedule I include “a high potential for abuse” 
and inadequate safety measures for supervising the drug’s use. Id. § 812(A)–(C).  
23. Id. § 841(a)(1)–(2). The federal government permits a small number of patients to receive medicinal 
marijuana through the Investigational New Drug Program. See Roger Parloff, How Marijuana Became Legal, 
FORTUNE MAGAZINE (Sept. 2009) http://archive.fortune.com/2009/09/11/magazines/fortune/medical_marijuana 
_legalizing.fortune/index.htm (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing how Irvin Rosenfield received 
marijuana from the federal government under an “investigative new drug program,” which has since been ended). 
24. See Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics v. Drug Enforcement Administration, 15 F.3d 1131, 1137 
(D.C. Cir. 1994) (finding the Administrator’s assertion that marijuana has not been proven to be medically 
beneficial is supported by substantial evidence).  
25. 21 U.S.C. § 829(a) (2009). 
26. See Parloff, supra note 23. 
27. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11362.5 (West 1996). Since the CUA was passed through voter 
initiative, the statute cannot be amended by the legislature unless the amendment is specifically related to the 
initiative empowers the legislature to amend its language. CAL. CONST. art. II, § 10(c); People v. Kelly, 47 Cal. 
4th 1008, 1025–1026 (1st Dist. 2013).  
28. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.5(b)(1)(A)–(B). 
29. Id. § 11362.5(d).  
30. Id. § 11362.5(b)(1)(A) (listing “cancer, anorexia, AIDS, chronic pain, spasticity, glaucoma, arthritis, 
migraine, or any other illness for which marijuana provides relief” as qualified illnesses).   
31. See id. § 11362.5 (only permitting use of marijuana with physician approval with no mention of 
recreational use). 
32. SENATE FLOOR, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 420, at 1–2 (Sept. 9, 2003).  
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caregivers who voluntarily apply for one.33 Law enforcement could then 
distinguish medicinal marijuana patients from others,34 and patients could access 
marijuana with a minimal chance of arrest.35  
While the MMPA does not formally define “dispensary,” it does state that 
primary caregivers and patients may “collectively or cooperatively . . . cultivate 
marijuana for medical purposes.”36 However, a county or city may restrict the 
geographical location of “cooperatives” that supply marijuana to patients.37 
Originally, the Department of Health Services intended to enforce the 
authorization of cooperative and collective cultivation.38 Yet, a September 2003 
amendment shifted the responsibility of preventing diversion—non-medical 
use—to the California Attorney General.39 
C. Localities Try to Clear Up the Smoke 
The lack of regulation in California’s medical marijuana laws left local 
governments in a precarious position.40 The MMPA immunizes those who qualify 
under the statute from State prosecution for collective and cooperative 
cultivation, but the state Legislature did not provide any direction on how to 
regulate these acts, making litigation inevitable.41 In response to the increasing 
number of marijuana storefronts, cities like Oakland enacted ordinances that 
required every dispensary to hold a business permit.42 Alternatively, Los Angeles 
did not impose licensing laws.43 Consequently, the city saw at least 850 medical 
marijuana storefront shops open, close, and re-open without authorization in 
 
33. HEALTH & SAFETY § 11362.7(c)–(d).  
34. Id. § 11362.71(a)(2). Additionally, in 2010 SB 1449 was enacted, which reduced a marijuana 
possession charge of 28.5 ounces or less from a misdemeanor to an infraction. Id. § 11357(b). Compare id. § 
11357(b) with id. § 11357(b) (West Supp. 2014). 
35. Id. § 11362.71(e).  
36. Id. § 11362.775.  
37. Id. § 11362.768(f). 
38. S.B. 420 § 2, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (as enacted Oct. 12, 2003). Section 11362.755 
initially appointed the Department of Health Services with the task of regulating, inspecting, and creating 
criteria for the security and quality of marijuana that these collectives and cooperatives would sell. Id.  
39. S.B. 420, 2003–2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2004) (enacted Oct. 12, 2003). 
40. See generally CAL. POLICE CHIEF’S ASS’N, MEDICAL MARIJUANA DISPENSARIES (2006), available at 
http://www.procon.org/sourcefiles/CAPCAWhitePaperonMarijuanaDispensaries.pdf (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (noting that because of their lucrative potential, need for secrecy, and high demand, marijuana 
dispensaries attract a substantial amount of criminal activity that is difficult to track).   
41. See William M. Welch, L.A.’s Marijuana Stores Take Root, USA TODAY (Mar. 3, 2007, 2:01 AM), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/2007-03-07-pot-clinics_N.htm?csp=34 (noting that in 2005, the 
number of dispensaries went from four to 98 and these dispensaries had “menus of varieties of pot for sale to 
anyone with a doctor’s note”); see also 420 Caregivers, LLC v. City of Los Angeles, 219 Cal. App. 4th 1316, 
1342 (2nd Dist., 2012) (holding that placing a limit on the number of individuals who collectively cultivated 
medical marijuana did not violate any provision within the MMPA and consequently did not violate 
California’s due process protection). 
42. OAK., CAL., BUS. REGS. ch. 5.80 (2007).  
43. L.A., CAL., Ordinances No. 182580 (2010). 
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2008 alone.44 In March 2013, Los Angeles enacted Proposition D, which banned 
all medical marijuana businesses except those businesses that, at the time, 
complied with the city’s marijuana laws.45 Today, while many cities restrict 
marijuana dispensaries through zoning laws, cities have the option of prohibiting 
dispensaries completely.46 
In response to the gaps in California’s marijuana laws and increasing 
marijuana use, cultivation, and sale the legislature presented a flux of legislative 
proposals,47 ballot initiatives,48 and guidelines.49 These proposals ranged from 
legalizing the recreational use of marijuana50 to creating an agency specifically 
designed to regulate the product within the Department of Alcoholic Beverage 
Control.51 
Additionally, judicial decisions have influenced marijuana’s legal 
landscape.52 A unanimous California Supreme Court in Riverside v. Inland 
Empire held that Riverside’s zoning laws, which banned marijuana dispensaries, 
were not preempted by state law.53 However, the Court in Inland Empire invited 
the legislature to clarify their holding.54 
 
44. Id. 
45. L.A., CAL., MUN. CODE ORDINANCES § 45.19.6 (2013). In effect, Proposition D grants an immunity 
to existing dispensaries until the California Supreme Court “rules regarding what cities can and cannot  regulate 
and the City enacts new medical marijuana legislation consistent with that judicial guidance.” L.A., CAL., 
Ordinance No. 182580 (2010). 
46. See Local California Dispensary Regulations, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS, http:// www.safeaccess 
now.org/article.php?id=3165 (last visited Sept. 8, 2010) (recognizing counties’ ability to ban dispensaries). 
47. Assemb. B. 473, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (as amended May 24, 2013, but not 
enacted);  Assemb. B. 604, 2013 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013) (as amended Sept. 11, 2013, but not 
enacted); Assemb. B. 2312., 2011 Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2011) (as amended May 25, 2012, but not 
enacted) (note that these proposals were all authored by the same Assembly Member, Tom Ammiano).  
48. See California Proposition 19, The Marijuana Legislation Initiative, UCHASTINGS.EDU, 60 (Nov. 2, 
2010), http://librarysource.uchastings.edu/ballot_pdf/2010g.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(proposing to legalize marijuana for cultivation, possession, and select commercial transactions).  
49. OFFICE OF THE ATT’Y GEN., GUIDELINES FOR THE SECURITY AND NON-DIVERSION OF MEDICAL 
MARIJUANA GROWN FOR MEDICAL USE GUIDELINES 1 (2008), available at http://ag.ca.gov/cms_attachments/ 
press/pdfs/n1601_medicalmarijuanaguidelines.pdf [hereinafter GUIDELINES] (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review).  
50. California Proposition 19, The Marijuana Legislation Initiative, supra note 48, at 92. 
51. Assemb. B. 473, 2013 Gen. Asseb., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013). 
52. See People v. Colvin, 203 Cal. App. 4th 1029, 1041 (2d Dist. 2012) (holding that collectives and 
cooperatives organized into retail style storefront dispensaries that make money to pay business expenses, and 
comply with local ordinances, are granted a defense under section 11362.775); see also People v. Jones, 112 
Cal. App. 4th 341, 350–51 (3d Dist. 2003) (holding that a defendant’s testimony that his doctor stated marijuana 
“might help, go ahead” constituted as sufficient evidence to raise a reasonable doubt about whether the 
statement qualified as a doctor recommendation under the CUA).   
53. City of Riverside v. Inland Empire Patients Health and Wellness Center Inc., 56 Cal. 4th 729, 762 
(2013).  
54. Id. at 763 (“Of course, nothing prevents future efforts by the Legislature, or by the People, to adopt a 
different approach. In the meantime, however, we must conclude that Riverside’s ordinances are not preempted 
by state law.”). 
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With the lack of cooperation between federal and state laws, the Department 
of Justice published a memorandum (DOJ Memo) to provide guidance to US 
Attorneys.55 While the DOJ Memo commits to enforcing the CSA, it also clarifies 
that the DOJ will only pursue cases that they consider a top priority.56 These 
priorities include:  
[1] Preventing the distribution of marijuana to minors; [2] Preventing 
revenue from the sale of marijuana from going to criminal enterprises, 
gangs, and cartels; [3] Preventing the diversion of marijuana from states 
where it is legal under state law in some form to other states; [4] 
Preventing state-authorized  marijuana activity from being used as a 
cover or pretext for the trafficking of other illegal drugs or illegal 
activity; [5] Preventing violence and the use of firearms in the cultivation 
and distribution of marijuana; [6] Preventing drugged driving and the 
exacerbation of other adverse public health consequences associated with 
marijuana use; [7] Preventing the growing of marijuana on public lands 
and the attendant public safety and environmental dangers posed by 
marijuana production on public lands; and [8] Preventing marijuana 
possession or use on federal property.57  
Despite California’s enthusiasm for medicinal marijuana, the United States 
Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich held that the federal government has the 
power to ban and prosecute marijuana users under the Commerce Clause.58 
Because of the holding in Gonzales, the Commerce Clause grants Congress the 
authority to proscribe local marijuana cultivation and use, and every time an 
individual uses, cultivates, or distributes the product, even if the state does not 
criminalize the acts, the individual is risking federal prosecution.59 
An initial bill authored by Assembly Member Tom Ammiano failed because 
it drew heavy criticism from the California Police Chief’s Association and the 
League of California Cities for placing enforcement within the Department of 
Alcoholic Beverage Control and not preserving local authority as described in 
Inland Empire.60 Simultaneously, Senator Lou Correa proposed SB 1262, which 
 
55. GUIDELINES, supra note 49, at 1.  
56. Id.  
57. Memorandum for All United States Attorneys, from James M. Cole, Deputy Attorney General (Aug. 
29, 2013), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/3052013829132756857467.pdf [hereinafter 
DOJ Memo] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
58. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005). 
59. Id. 
60. Chris Roberts, New Weed Order: California Cops are at Last Making a Dope Deal, S.F. WEEKLY 
(July 2, 2014), http://www.sfweekly.com/2014-07-02/news/chem-tales-tom-ammiano-police-union-marijuana-
legalization/ (on file with the McGeorge Law Review); see also Jeremy White, California Bill Regulating 
Medical Marijuana Fails in Assembly, SACRAMENTO BEE (May 29, 2014), http://blogs.sacbee.com/ 
capitolalertlatest/2014/05/bill-regulating-medical-marijuana.html (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(stating that some lawmakers were concerned with the lack of local control in the bill). 
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drew considerable media coverage because, for the first time in 18 years, police 
associations were willing to recognize the medical marijuana industry.61  
At first, SB 1262 was considered a pro-law enforcement, anti-medical 
marijuana bill.62 However, through the legislative process the bill transformed 
into a compromise between medical marijuana advocates and law enforcement.63 
As a result, SB 1262 was an attempt to combine the many interests of law 
enforcement, the federal government, and the medical marijuana industry.64 
D. Everybody’s Doing It 
Many other states that allow medical marijuana have already created a 
scheme—thus California has multiple models at its disposal.65 Out of the 20 
states and the District of Columbia that authorize marijuana’s medicinal or 
recreational use, 14 have laws that specifically regulate dispensaries.66 For 
example, Arizona dispensaries must be non-profit organizations, must be at least 
500 feet away from schools, and may either grow their own marijuana or accept 
homegrown marijuana from qualified patients.67 Similarly, in Nevada a person 
can own different types of medical marijuana facilities at the same time.68 
Initially, Colorado’s dispensary law used a vertical integration model, 
requiring every marijuana business to be involved in growing, processing, and 
selling the drug.69 This year, the state opened the market to businesses that 
specialize in one field.70 In Colorado, cultivation sites must also be licensed in 
 
61. Roberts, supra note 60. 
62. See id. (noting that the first version only allowed primary care physicians to recommend medicinal 
marijuana and many of these doctors are unwilling to recommend the drug). 
63. See Don Duncan, So, What’s the Deal with SB 1262?, AMERICANS FOR SAFE ACCESS (Aug. 2, 2014), 
http://www.safeaccessnow.org/so_what_s_the_deal_with_sb_1262  (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(recognizing that after Assembly Member Ammiano added portions from his AB 1894 bill there was a lot of 
“back-and-forth” with the bill).  
64. See editorial, Legislature Fails, Again, to Regulate Medical Marijuana, SACRAMENTO BEE (Aug. 15, 
2014), www.sacbee.com/incoming/article26026844.htmlx (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).(recognizing 
that SB 1262 was “the closest the Legislature had come to a compromise”). Importantly, Senator Correa was 
originally the sole author of SB 1262, but after Assembly Member Ammiano’s proposed medicinal marijuana bill 
failed, he became a co-author. Id.  
65. See generally Marijuana Policy Project, State-by-State Medical Marijuana Laws: How to Remove the 
Threat of Arrest, MPP, http://norml.org/legal/medical-marijuana-2 (last visited Sept. 13, 2014) (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (listing each state’s marijuana laws). Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, Rhode Island, and Vermont all have state-licensing programs that regulate dispensaries. Id. 
66. Id. 
67. Ariz. Proposition 203 (2010), available at http://www.azsos.gov/election/2010/info/pubpamphlet/ 
english/prop203.htm. 
68. 2013 Nev. Stat. 3695. 
69. COL. TASK FORCE, TASK FORCE REPORT ON THE IMPLEMENTATION OF AMENDMENT 64, at 17 (2013), 
available at http://www.colorado.gov/cms/forms/dor-%09tax/A64TaskForceFinalReport.pdf (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review).  
70. COLO. CODE REGS. § 212-1:1.202 (West 2014).  
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compliance with standard health and safety requirements, which are enforced by 
local entities, such as building inspectors and fire departments.71 Each dispensary 
pays a designated application fee based on how many patients purchase the drug 
from that medical marijuana center.72  
In contrast, Washington uses a multi-tier model where businesses in each 
stage of production may only hold one license for the purpose of avoiding 
monopolies in the industry and encouraging smaller businesses to  compete.73 
These regulatory schemes provide a glimpse into how California can approach 
the daunting task of regulating commercial marijuana.74 
III. SB 1262 
SB 1262 would have regulated all levels of the medical marijuana industry 
and implemented stricter oversight of physician recommendations.75 The bill 
would have defined dispensaries as “a distribution operation that provides 
medical marijuana or medical marijuana derived products . . . to patients.”76 A 
dispensary would have been distinguished from a “‘[l]icensed manufacturer’ . . . 
who extracts, prepares, derives, produces, compounds, or repackages medical 
marijuana or medical marijuana products into consumable and nonconsumable 
forms.”77 The legislation would have structured the marijuana industry as a chain 
of commerce where each level of production was designated a specified task.78 
This organized supply chain would have included licensed cultivation sites, 
manufacturers, dispensing facilities, transporters, and certified testing 
laboratories.79  
For all dispensary facilities, cultivation sites, and manufacturers seeking to 
carry out their designated function, SB 1262 would have required that each 
obtain a license80 from the newly created Bureau of Medical Marijuana 
 
71. Id. § 212-1:1.407.  
72. Id. § 212-1:1.207.  
73. WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 314-55-075 (Westlaw, current through 2014).  
74. See generally Office of Nat’l Drug Control Policy, Marijuana Resource Center: State Laws Related 
to Marijuana, WHITEHOUSE.GOV, http://www.whitehouse.gov/ondcp/state-laws-related-to-marijuana (last 
visited Aug. 10, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (depicting the different approaches to 
marijuana industry regulation).  
75. SB 1262 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. at § 2 (Cal. 2014) (as amended and corrected by Assemb. Comm. on 
Appropriations, Aug. 7, 2014, but not enacted); id. at § 4 (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18101(a)–(c)); 
id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18102(a)–(b)). 
76. Id. at § 4 (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18100(f)). 
77. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §18100(f)–(j)). 
78. Id. at § 4 (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18106(a)–(e)); see also id. (adding CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 18114) (recognizing that a licensee may only “acquire, cultivate, process, possess, store, deliver, 
transfer, transport, or dispense medical marijuana” for a purpose listed within the provision).  
79. See id. at § 4 (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18100(b)–(k)) (defining the different levels of 
the manufacture process). For example, a “licensed manufacturer means a person who extracts, prepares, 
derives, produces, compounds, or repackages” the drug. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18100(j)). 
80. S.B. 1262 at § 4, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2014) (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18102(c)). 
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Regulation (the Bureau) within the Department of Consumer Affairs.81 The Chief, 
as a representative of the Bureau, would have had the duty to administer and 
enforce the regulations and requirements implemented by SB 1262.82 A loan from 
the Department of Consumer Affairs would have funded the Bureau and been 
repaid through licensing fees.83 License issuance and the associated collection of 
fee revenue would have commenced on January 1, 2016.84 
The Bureau would have charged a license fee of up to $8,000 for each 
applicant, although the Bureau would only have been permitted to grant each 
applicant a license for “one class of specified medical marijuana activit[y].”85 
Prior to receiving a license, a business would have been required to comply with 
all local regulations and permit requirements.86 Thus, a license would not have 
been issued to an establishment that was located in a locality that banned 
marijuana businesses.87 Additionally, the Bureau also would have had the right to 
renew, revoke, and suspend a license for a broad range of reasons.88 Further, 
under this legislation, facilities that obtained valid licenses would have been 
required to enforce certain security measures.89 
For dispensaries in existence prior to SB 1262 that complied with existing 
local laws, the Bureau would have consulted with the local agency and may have 
issued a provisional license to the business.90 However, the Bureau would have 
been prohibited from issuing a provisional license to any entity (or individual) 
that had a pending local or state proceeding against them.91 Furthermore, a 
business would have been denied if it employed an individual who had a past 
federal conviction for drug trafficking.92 Once a business obtained a provisional 
 
Prior to acquiring a license, an applicant must supply the following: name, address, telephone number, 
description of the business, completed application, fee payment, fingerprints, and any additional information the 
department requires. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18108(a)–(b)). 
81. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18102(a)).   
82. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18102(e)).  
83. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18103).  
84. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18108(a)).  
85. Id. (adding CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18101.2(g)). There are narrow exceptions, which permit a 
dispensary to grow marijuana within a 1,000-foot piece of land and each production level may also hold a 
transporting license in addition to their cultivation, manufacturing, or dispensary license. Id.  
86. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18108(e)).  
87. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18129).  
88. Id. The Bureau may deny, suspend, or revoke a license for any reason that “would be contrary to 
public welfare or morals” or if the applicant “has violated any law prohibiting conduct involving moral 
turpitude.” Id. 
89. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18124). These security measures include: restricting access 
to the facility to only facility agents, primary caregivers, and qualified patients; limited access areas that are 
only accessible by authorized personnel; and all marijuana shall be stored in a safe, vault, or secure room that is 
locked. Id.   
90. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18107(a)(1)). A marijuana business that has immunity 
under Los Angeles’ Proposition D may also be eligible for a provisional license. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & 
PROF. CODE § 18133).  
91. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18107(d)). 
92. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18110(a)(3)).  
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license, that facility could have only received marijuana from “other 
provisionally licensed entities.”93 SB 1262 would have also placed “limit[s] . . . 
[on] the number of licensed cultivation sites statewide to prevent the diversion of 
medical marijuana for nonmedical purposes.”94 
Marijuana delivery and transportation would have required a separate license 
and such transportation could only have occurred between licensed facilities.95 
Before transporting marijuana, SB 1262 would have required a licensed 
processing or dispensary facility to request a specific quantity and keep adequate 
records.96 At least two employees were to supervise vehicles transporting the 
drug, and drivers could not have transported marijuana across state lines. 97 
SB 1262 also would have created a system to test medicinal marijuana.98 
Licensed facilities would have been required to contract with a “certified testing 
laboratory” to have their product tested.99 The legislation would have required 
licensed dispensaries and other establishments to agree on a protocol that ensured 
the marijuana for sale was safe.100 Any food containing marijuana, such as 
cookies or brownies, would have been subject to specified requirements 
depending on whether the edible was baked, refrigerated, or served hot.101 This 
regulation would have required each edible to be individually wrapped and 
labeled with a special warning.102 
SB 1262 would have subjected physicians who recommended marijuana to 
greater scrutiny.103 The bill would have required a doctor-patient relationship to 
exist before a doctor could have given a recommendation.104 Further, after 
recommending medicinal marijuana to a patient, a doctor could not have 
 
93. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18107(e)).  
94. Id. § 18134. The number of cultivation sites allowed will be determined by first considering the 
number of legal sites permitted by local law. Id. The Bureau will then consider factors such as keeping the 
number of sites at a reasonable amount such that the Bureau can enforce regulation. Id.    
95. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18115(a)).  
96. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18115(b)–(c)).  
97. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18117(a), (d)). 
98. Id. (amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18105(a)(5)). 
99. Id. at § 7 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111660(a)). 
100. Id. (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111661(a)–(c)). These agreements must include 
recall procedures, testing to “eliminate microbiological contaminants and chemical residue” and a sufficient 
label. Id. § 11161(b). The label must state Tetrahydrocannabinol (THC) and cannabidiol (CBD) levels, a clear 
warning that marijuana is within the product and a dosage. Id. 
101. Id. (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111662).  
102. Id. (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111662(d), (f)). The label must include the date of 
manufacture, the drug’s net weight, and the THC and CBD levels. Id. Additionally, no pictures of food may be 
placed on the package and “only generic food names may be used . . . [f]or example, ‘snickerdoodle’ may not 
be used to describe a cinnamon cookie.” Id. (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111662(g)–(h)).   
103. See id. at § 2 (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE §2220.05(a)(3)) (requiring strict compliance with 
the Federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and close monitoring of prescriptions 
by providers). 
104. Id. at § 3 (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 2525.2) (noting that the doctor must be considered 
“the patient’s attending physician”). 
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“accept[ed], solicit[ed], or offer[ed]” compensation to a facility.105 Additionally, 
SB 1262 would have required any advertisement that offered a physician’s 
medical marijuana recommendation to state the requisite disclosure information 
under the CUA.106 Further, the Medical Board of California would have 
investigated doctors who excessively recommended the drug107 and collaborated 
with the Center for Medical Cannabis Research in creating medical guidelines.108 
Finally, local governments would have had the discretion to implement a tax 
on marijuana activities, regardless of whether or not the activity was for profit.109 
IV. ANALYSIS 
Since California legalized medical marijuana nearly twenty years ago and 
state laws have continued to ignore any organized supply chain, the present 
questions are how to effectively regulate the industry, satisfy the federal 
government, and provide a safe drug to patients.110 With marijuana’s industrial 
expansion, California has many reasons to create a regulatory system.111 As with 
any new government rollout, SB 1262 would have raised several issues, 
including whether local governments would have been capable of policing the 
industry, whether the legislation would have interfered with qualified patients’ 
access to the drug, which may have violated the CUA, and how the proposed 
obligations would have affected existing businesses.112 Finally, a critical issue 
would have been whether SB 1262 successfully achieved the priorities expressed 
by the federal government and consequently, whether those working within the 
marijuana industry would have been protected from federal prosecution.113 
A. Incentive for Marijuana Control 
California’s lack of statewide marijuana control for nearly twenty years has 
led to severe consequences.114 In 2013, California had the highest number of 
 
105. Id. (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 2525(a)).  
106. Id. at § 4 (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 18123)(a). 
107. Id. at § 2 (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE §2220.05(a)(3)). 
108. Id. at § 3 (amending CAL. BUS & PROF. CODE § 2525.1). 
109. Id. at § 5 (amending CAL. GOV’T CODE § 23028(a)(1)–(4)).  
110. See Press Release, Tom Ammiano, Assembly Member, Cal. State Assembly, Public Safety 
Committee Passes Medical Cannabis Regulation Bill (June 26, 2014) [hereinafter Press Release, Assembly 
Member Ammiano, Medical Cannabis Regulation] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (“This bill will not 
hurt local communities or take control from them. It will benefit them and make sure they are in the driver’s 
seat, with backup from state regulation. This is a win-win for California.”). 
111. Infra Part IV.A. 
112. See infra Part IV.B–C (discussing the many debates regarding SB 1262). 
113. See infra Part IV.D; see also GUIDELINES, supra note 49 (noting that the listed priorities are 
guidelines for U.S. attorneys and not mandates).  
114. See People v. Hochanadel, 98 Cal. Rptr. 3d 347 (4th Dist. 2009) (finding that a storefront dispensary 
does not become a primary caregiver when a qualified patient names that dispensary as their supplier). 
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cultivated marijuana plants—a total of 2,903,887 marijuana plants were recorded 
in California, while Kentucky came in second with 443,788.115 Naturally, given 
the enormous amount of cultivated marijuana and the lack of statewide 
regulation, contamination and adverse environmental effects progressively 
increased.116  
In 2009, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office took a sample of marijuana 
that was available to patients—it had 1,600 times the amount of bifenthrin (a type 
of insecticide) than a human should legally consume.117 In 2012, the U.S. Forest 
Service removed 180,000 pounds of trash, 315,000 feet of black plastic hose, and 
19,000 pounds of fertilizer from more than 300 illegal marijuana guerilla grows 
in the state.118 Moreover, without restriction on who could operate a dispensary or 
where one could be located, dispensaries multiplied from the single digits to 
thousands in neighborhoods and near schools and churches.119  
Additionally, with physicians’ broad discretion to recommend marijuana 
under the CUA, the line between medicinal use and recreational use was 
obscured.120 Finally, without a statewide standard, federal law enforcement has 
threatened marijuana businesses in compliance with local ordinances (such as 
Harborside in Oakland) with federal prosecution.121 Consequently, with growing 
 
Interestingly, this dispensary had an annual expense rate that went over $2.6 million, with a $ 1.7 million annual 
revenue rate. Id. at 1,006.   
115. DOMESTIC CANNABIS ERADICATION/SUPPRESSION PROGRAM STATISTICAL REPORT 2013, DEA, 
available at http://www.justice.gov/dea/ops/cannabis_2013.pdf (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
116. See Marijuana Crops in California Threaten Forests and Wildlife, D.A.R.E. (June 28, 2013), 
http://www.dare.org/marijuana-crops-in-california-threaten-forests-and-wildlife (on file with the McGeorge 
Law Review) (explaining that growers often use poisons like d-Con to protect the crop from vermin, which then 
poisons other animals in the area). 
117. Nicholas Sullivan, Determination of Pesticide Residues in Cannabis Smoke, 2013 J. of Toxicology 
1–2 (2013). 
118. USDA Forest Service, Marijuana Grows and Restoration, YOUTUBE (USDA Forest Service Feb. 
28, 2014), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IFNe_KZhPZw (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
119. Compare MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATION AND TAXATION ORDINANCE (PROPOSITION D) 26 
(Cal. 2010) (estimating about 1,600 dispensaries in Los Angeles) with John Ingold, Colorado Medical-
Marijuana Businesses Have Declined By 40 Percent, DENVER POST (Mar. 3, 2013), http://www.denverpost. 
com/ci_22706453/colorado-medical-marijuana-businesses-have-declined (on file with the McGeorge Law 
Review) (noting that since passing regulatory dispensary laws, Colorado dispensaries have decreased from 
1,117 in 2010, to 675 in 2013). 
120. See Rebecca Dresser, Irrational Basis: The Legal Status of Marijuana, HASTINGS CENTER REPORT 
10-11-07, 8 (2009) (noting the significant business of marijuana growth for recreational use). Doctors who 
solely specialize in medical marijuana recommendations often have couriers who deliver the drug for insomnia, 
headaches, or anxiety “with the practiced efficiency of a home-delivered pizza—and with just about as much 
legal scrutiny.” Id.  
121. See Letter from Melinda Haag, U.S. Attorney Gen. for the N. Dist. of Cal., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, to 
John A. Russo, Oakland City Attorney on guidance regarding the City of Oakland Medical Cannabis 
Cultivation Ordinance (Feb. 1, 2011) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that Congress listed 
marijuana as a controlled substance such that the growing, distributing, and possessing is a violation of federal 
law); see also Blowing Smoke: Obama Promises One Thing, Does Another on Medical Marijuana, S.F. 
WEEKLY (Apr. 6, 2011), http://www.sfweekly.com/sanfrancisco/blowing-smoke-obama-promises-one-thing-
does-antother-on-medical-marijuana/Content?oid=2181100 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) 
(discussing raids by the Obama administration of more than 74 licensed dispensaries, with the majority in 
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concerns about public safety and health, as well as federal prosecution, the state 
recognized that the medical marijuana industry needed state regulation.122 
B. Regulating the Wild, Wild West 
SB 1262’s two authors proposed the legislation to impose substantial 
regulation on a previously unregulated industry.123 The California League of 
Cities believed SB 1262 would have created the requisite regulatory framework, 
as the bill created a state-level licensing system, but preserved local control by 
only granting the State the authority to issue licenses to marijuana facilities after 
the applicant provided adequate proof that the local government allowed such 
facilities.124 Similarly, the legislation would have deferred to local land use power 
by continuing to allow local governments to ban dispensaries.125 While many 
advocates supported the intent of SB 1262, some of SB 1262’s supporters, like 
California National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws (NORML), 
believe that a separate licensing system necessary for this industry because each 
activity is “better conducted at distinct, stand-alone facilities.”126 
Sponsors anticipated that the legislation would have provided for a safer 
product, since the regulation would have required random testing “of all medical 
marijuana prior to packaging for sale and patient exposure to identify and 
eliminate microbiological contaminants and chemical residue.”127 According to 
Dr. Robert Martin, roughly 80% of Southern California dispensaries do not test 
their marijuana,128 and as a result bacteria from dirty barns and unclean hands 
contaminate the crop, which increases the chance of E. coli poisoning.129  
With a background in the federal food regulation industry, Dr. Martin says 
that just as with any food product, medical marijuana must have a quality 
assurance protocol that ensures the crop is safe for patients.130 He believes that 
 
California).    
122. CAL. POLICE CHIEFS ASS’N, supra note 9.  
123. See ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1262, at 1–7 (June 
26, 2014) (creating 54 requirements for regulating marijuana). 
124. See id. at 12 (asserting California League of Cities’ support for SB 1262). 
125. LEAGUE OF CALIFORNIA CITIES, SB 1262 (CORREA): MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATION AND 
LOCAL CONTROL, INFORMATION WEBINAR, 18 (Feb, 25, 2014), available at http://www.cacities.org/Resources-
Documents/Policy-Advocacy-Section/ Hot-Issues/Marijuana-Policy/Medical-Marijuana-SB-1262-Webinar.aspx 
(on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
126. Letter from Dale Gieringer, Director, Cal. NORML, to Senator Ted Lieu, Committee on Business, 
Professions and Economic Development (Mar. 7, 2014) (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (supporting 
the intent behind SB 1262 but suggesting amendments prior to full support). 
127. SB 1262 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. at § 7 (Cal. 2014) (as corrected Aug. 7, 2014, but not enacted) 
(amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 111661(b)). 
128. Telephone Interview with Robert Martin, co-founder of CW Analytical Laboratories (May 29, 2014) 
(notes on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (explaining that marijuana grows relatively clean, but like any 
crop there must be standards and practices of hygiene and certification to provide a clean product). 
129. Id. 
130. Id. At his own testing facility, Dr. Martin provides a certificate of guarantee to every dispensary after 
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businesses that fail to test their marijuana would have complied with SB 1262’s 
testing requirements because a tested product is an indication of business 
acumen.
131
 In response to the claim that a testing requirement would interfere 
with patients’ easy access to medical marijuana, Dr. Martin believes that if a 
business wishes to remain in the industry and provide a safer drug to qualified 
patients, they would ultimately have complied with the proposed testing 
requirement.132 
Some critics were concerned that local governments would have been unable 
to provide adequate law and safety enforcement to execute SB 1262’s 
requirements.133 Local public health departments do not have the training or 
expertise to enforce laws relating to medicinal marijuana.134 SB 1262 specifies 
that local governments would have had primary responsibility to administer and 
enforce regulations created by the Bureau, but many local governments are 
adamant that local agencies are not capable of regulating the growth and harvest 
of marijuana.135  
However, the Bay Area has had success in regulating commercial marijuana 
activity.136 After enacting its marijuana dispensary-licensing requirement, 
Oakland appointed a local agency to oversee the implementation and 
enforcement of its marijuana legislative landscape.137 Once California’s 
legislature passed the MMPA in 2004 and the number of dispensaries began to 
increase steadily outside of Oakland, the number of dispensaries within the city 
remained relatively low.138 This was because Oakland’s ordinance limits the total 
number of dispensaries to eight.139 Additionally, Oakland requires that marijuana 
 
testing, which then allows him to partner with these vendors because it gives them the feeling that they are 
receiving a quality product. Id.   
131. Id.   
132. Id. “I don’t think [marijuana businesses] understand business planning if they see testing as a block 
to providing safe access to patients. If you are concerned about giving a safe product then you want to provide a 
safe product.” Id.  
133. See Paul A. Smith, Senate Bill 1262—Oppose Unless Amended (Apr. 24, 2014) (“[W]e believe that 
SB 1262 requires a dramatic restructuring to limit a county’s role and responsibilities and place the date-to-day 
regulation of medical marijuana with the State of California.”). 
134. SENATE COMMITTEE ON HEALTH, MEDICAL MARIJUANA REGULATION OF PHYSICIANS, 
DISPENSARIES, AND CULTIVATION SITES, at 9 (Apr. 30, 2014). 
135. Id. See, e.g., Joseph Leeper, Humboldt County: It’s Role in the Emerald Triangle, XXX Cal. 
Geographical Society 93, 94 (1999) (noting that some counties, such as Mendocino, Humboldt, and Trinity, 
have faced numerous odor complaints, excessive electricity use, and increased crime including robbery and 
burglary since medical marijuana was legalized). 
136. Thomas Heddleston, A Tale of Three Cities: Medical Marijuana, Activism, and Local Regulation in 
California, 35 HUMBOLDT J. OF SOC. REL. 123, 132 (2013).  
137. Deborah A. Edgerly, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE MEASURE Z COMMUNITY OVERSIGHT COMMITTEE 
FOR 2006, Pub. Safety Comm., Reg. Sess., at exhibit B (2007).  
138. See Thomas Heddleston, supra note 136, at 133 FIGURE 1 (2013) (comparing Oakland’s regulatory 
approach to Los Angeles’ laissez faire approach where between 2004 and 2008, Oakland’s number of 
dispensaries increased from approximately 25 to 40 while Los Angeles saw an increase from approximately 4 to 
200 dispensaries). 
139. Arturo M. Sanchez, CITY OF OAKLAND AGENDA REPORT, Pub. Safety Comm., at 9 (Cal. 2011). 
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sold at dispensaries must be tested for safety and THC levels, and as a result, 
more than 80% of all dispensaries in the area regularly test their product.140  
These numbers support the notion that local governments have the ability to keep 
dispensary businesses at a reasonable number and enforce regulations pertaining 
to testing and taxation.141  
In contrast, a minority of localities have laws that regulate marijuana 
cultivation.142 One example is Mendocino County, which imposes a zip-tie 
provision where the Sheriff’s Department distributes zip-ties to marijuana 
growers—approximately 100 in total—who place the zip-tie around the plant; 
this way law enforcement can distinguish between legal and illegal plants.143 
While this regulation has proved workable for the area, very few other localities 
have grow regulations in place, and consequently would have had to create new 
grow laws to comply with SB 1262.144 Therefore, while localities would have had 
the capability of enforcing SB 1262’s dispensary provisions, it is unclear whether 
cities and counties could have successfully regulated commercial cultivation.145 
C. Access, Continuance, and Costs: Opposition Has High Concerns 
“Mom and pop” marijuana farmers have voiced a concern about their ability 
to continue to operate under a regulatory scheme like that proposed under SB 
1262.146 The Mendocino Cannabis Policy Council has argued that there needs to 
be a limit on how many plants a farm may grow, otherwise smaller farms will be 
forced out of business.147 Additionally, the $8,000 non-refundable fee would have 
 
140. Id. at 9.  
141. Heddleston, supra note 136, at 132 (describing Oakland’s progressive approach to regulating 
dispensaries kept the total number of dispensaries  down, limited their proximity to schools, and created 
financial standards on those seeking to enter the industry).  
142. Letter from Dale Gieringer, Director, Cal NORML, to Mike Gatto, Chair, Assemb. Appropriations 
Comm. on Cal NORML’s New Position on SB 1262 (Aug. 11, 2014), available at http://www. 
canorml.org/SB1262_Approps_le2.pdf [hereinafter Letter from California NORML, Cal NORML’s New 
Position] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
143. See Joe Mozingo, Mendocino County Spars with Feds over Conflicting Marijuana Laws, L.A. TIMES 
(Jan. 20, 2013), http://articles.latimes.com/2013/jan/20/local/la-me-mendo-pot-20130122 (on file with the 
McGeorge Law Review) (describing the use of zip-ties to identify legal plants). 
144. See California NORML, Local Medical Marijuana Cultivation and Possession Guidelines in 
California, CANORML (last updated Sept. 13, 2014), http://www.canorml.org/medical-marijuana/local-growing-
limits-in-california#RanchoCordova (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (noting that out of the few cities 
and counties that have grow regulations, most of them apply to individual gardens and not large crops, although 
some cities and counties have simply banned outdoor marijuana cultivation altogether). 
145. See id. (discussing the limited use of cultivation regulations). 
146. See Letter from Karen O’Keefe, Director of State Polices, Marijuana Pol’y Project, and Chris 
Lindsey, Legislative Analyst, Marijuana Pol’y Project to Mike Gatto, Chair, Assemb. Appropriations Comm., 
on, Revised Comments on SB 1262, MPP Opposes Unless Amended, at 1 (Aug. 5, 2014), available at 
http://www.mpp.org/states/ california/SB-1262-Concerns.pdf [hereinafter Letter from Marijuana Policy Project, 
Opposes Unless Amended] (on file with the McGeorge Law Review) (discussing concerns regarding the lack of 
tiered fees for smaller growers). 
147. Jane Futcher, Cannabis Group Vows to Protect Mendocino’s Mom and Pop Growers, AVA NEWS 
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been difficult for small farmers to pay, and as a result would have forced them to 
cease cultivation or continue to grow without a license, violating the proposed 
law under SB 1262.148 
Marijuana advocates also opposed SB 1262’s proposed regulations on 
existing marijuana businesses.149 As a result of compromise, the legislation gave 
pre-existing entities a grace period in which the Bureau would have issued a 
provisional license until the enterprise could apply for a standard license to avoid 
business interruption.150 However, critics like the MMPA asserted that the 
provision gave the Bureau too much discretion when issuing a provisional 
license.151 “The [B]ureau should be required, not allowed, to issue provisional 
licenses to entities that operate in compliance with local laws.”152  
For example, Colorado gave preferential treatment to existing medical 
marijuana businesses and it awarded businesses that complied with local 
regulations state-issued licenses.153 By expediting a smoother transition for 
existing businesses in compliance with local law, Colorado ensured that state 
regulators would oversee businesses that were already established and familiar 
with regulatory compliance; thus, the state shaped the foundation of an industry 
to be more likely to comply with the new regulations.154 
Additionally, since SB 1262 would have denied employment to those who 
had a “past felony criminal conviction for drug trafficking,” many who had 
previous convictions related to marijuana would have been denied employment 
opportunities within the marijuana industry.155 According to California NORML, 
“Prior offenders should not be branded for life for offenses that are now 
becoming obsolescent.”156 However, this provision would have incorporated 
priorities that the federal government expects states to implement.157 
Another criticism of the legislation was its potential interference with patient 
access to medical marijuana.158 In many cities and counties that ban dispensaries, 
 
SERVICE (June 21, 2014), http://theava.com/archives/32539 (on file with the McGeorge Law Review).  
148. See Letter from Marijuana Policy Project, Opposes Unless Amended, supra note 146, at 5 (calling 
the fee “unreasonable”).  
149. Id.  
150. SB 1262 Leg., 2013–2014 Sess. at § 4 (Cal. 2014) (as corrected Aug. 7, 2014, but not enacted) 
(amending CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 18107(a)(1)); see also Duncan, supra note 63 (asserting that ASA 
helped negotiate an easier transition for existing businesses).   
151. Letter from Marijuana Policy Project, Opposes Unless Amended, supra note 146, at 1. 
152. Id at 5. 
153. JOHN HUDAK, CENTER FOR EFFECTIVE PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AT BROOKINGS, COLORADO’S 
ROLLOUT OF LEGAL MARIJUANA IS SUCCEEDING 27 (July 2014), available at http://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/reports/2014/07/colorado-marijuana-legalization-succeeding (on file with the McGeorge Law Review). 
154. Id. at 10. 
155. ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC SAFETY, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF SB 1262, at 13 (June 26, 
2014). 
156. Letter from California NORML, Cal NORML’s New Position, supra note 142, at 2.  
157. See DOJ Memo, supra note 57, at 1 (prioritizing the prevention of the use of a state licensed 
marijuana business for disguising other illegal activity).  
158. See People v. Kelly, 47 Cal. 4th 1008, 1042 (2010) (holding that amendments made by the legislator 
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patients rely on receiving their supply from other patients and caregivers who 
grow marijuana through cooperatives.159 By prohibiting this activity to continue, 
SB 1262 would have forced many patients to find a new supplier located outside 
of the city or county in which they lived.160 Moreover, the Medical Marijuana 
Policy Project stresses that limiting the number of cultivation sites could 
potentially cause shortages and thereby deprive patients access to medical 
marijuana.161 Because SB 1262 would have only allowed dispensaries to receive 
their supply from licensed cultivation sites, other sources of supply, including 
overages grown by cooperatives, would no longer have supplied the market.162 
Without this source of marijuana, shortages could cause dispensaries to close or 
to obtain the drug from a black market supplier.163  
Similarly, Colorado initially only issued licenses to pre-existing businesses 
and prevented any new business from applying for a license until 2014.164 
According to the Center for Effective Public Management at Brookings, limiting 
the pool of applicants during the implementation stage was beneficial because it 
allowed regulators at the state level “breathing room to get the regulatory model 
right.”165 Nonetheless, NORML claimed that since many localities did not 
regulate cultivation sites prior to SB 1262’s proposal (with the exception of 
Mendocino County), the existing sites would have failed to provide proof that 
they complied with local laws, and thus have been ineligible for a state-issued 
license.166 
Additionally, legislators forecasted that the Bureau’s launch would have cost 
at minimum $20 million and these costs could have exceeded profits from license 
fees.167 This startup cost—which would have been $58 million—is charged to the 
Department of Consumer Affairs’ budget and represents 35% of the 
Department’s total budget.168 Given the legal risk that would have been inherent 
in applying for a license, California NORML estimates that profits from 
provisional license fees would have been at most $3 million, not enough to 
provide the capital necessary to fund the program.169 However, it is unclear 
whether NORML’s profit estimate took into account the potential profits from 
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marijuana tax revenue, which could have been used to fund the state’s 
infrastructure.170 
Lastly, critics argue that the proposed amendment that would have limited 
physician recommendations to a patient’s “attending physician” interfered with a 
qualified patient’s ability to access marijuana and would have illegally amended 
the CUA.171 This restriction could have potentially hindered a qualified patient’s 
access to the drug because many primary care physicians refuse to recommend 
medical marijuana.172 This is because many hospitals prohibit marijuana 
recommendations and doctors working within these hospitals do not want to 
place their HMO or DEA license at risk.173  
However, the CUA does not prevent the Medical Board of California from 
taking disciplinary actions against physicians “who fail to comply with accepted 
medical standards when recommending marijuana,” and these standards include 
history between the physician and patient.174 Ultimately, determining whether  
requiring a patient to get a medical marijuana recommendation from an attending 
physician violates the CUA depends on whether the provision is understood as an 
amendment to the voter initiative (which would violate California’s constitution) 
or whether the provision is perceived as regulating a related,  but distinct, area of 
law (which is permissible).175 
D. Preventing Federal Prosecution 
As Gonzalez illustrates, persons who comply with California’s CUA are still 
at risk of facing federal charges under the Commerce Clause.176 This is because 
Congress may regulate intrastate activity, though purely local, that aggregately 
affects interstate commerce.177 However, advocates argue that states with a 
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statewide regulatory system are less vulnerable to federal interference.178 Indeed, 
Attorney General Eric Holder announced that federal interference would not 
occur in states that had “strong and effective regulatory and enforcement 
systems.”179  
For example, Colorado’s attorney general has allowed hundreds of 
dispensaries throughout the state to continue to operate and stated, “there’s not 
going to be a substantial change” since the state implemented its marijuana 
regulatory scheme.180 SB 1262 sought to achieve this same end through the 
Bureau and to address relevant priorities in the DOJ Memo.181 
 Background checks on those who would have applied for a permit under SB 
1262 could have reduced the opportunities for drug trafficking organizations to 
participate in the medical marijuana industry.182 Colorado and Washington have 
both adopted this strategy.183 By preventing individuals with past felony 
convictions from working in dispensaries, SB 1262 could have prevented 
members of gangs and other criminal enterprises from working and profiting 
from the industry.184 Additionally, SB 1262 attempted to thwart criminals from 
profiting from California’s medicinal marijuana industry by tracking where the 
supply came from, which would have reduced the possibility that revenues 
funded illegal activities.185 For example, drug trafficking organizations from 
Mexico that cultivate marijuana in California and sell the drug to dispensaries 
would have had a harder time continuing this activity because the Bureau would 
have required the dispensary to provide the origin of the supply.186 
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The federal government also prohibits marijuana from leaving the state, and 
according to a lead advocate for marijuana legalization, Alison Holcomb, “excess 
supply creates incentive to divert outside the state.”187 For example, the state of 
Washington conducted detailed studies to predict the amount of marijuana use 
within the state so regulations could limit the total amount of marijuana 
production, which is capped at 80 metric tons.188 Similarly, by limiting cultivation 
sites and relying on local governments to limit the number of dispensaries, SB 
1262 would have capped marijuana output on a broader scale.189 
Even if SB 1262 could have successfully carried out the priorities listed by 
the DOJ, the threat of federal prosecution would still remain.190 To the extent that 
the DOJ memorandum grants any rights at all, it is left to the U.S. Attorney’s 
discretion.191 Melinda Haag, the U.S. Attorney for the Northern District of 
California, has taken an aggressive stance against the marijuana industry.192 In a 
letter to Oakland’s city attorney, she stated: “We will enforce the [CSA] 
vigorously against individuals and organizations . . . even if such activities are 
permitted under state law.”193 Because enforcing the CSA is largely within the 
U.S. Attorney General’s discretion, even if SB 1262 could have adequately 
enforced the relevant priorities, the industry would still have been at risk.194 
E. Why Did SB 1262 Burn Out? 
Considering the number of revisions and instances when marijuana advocacy 
groups voiced their support, withdrew their support, and reestablished their 
support, there are many theories offered about why SB 1262 never made it 
beyond the Assembly Appropriations Committee.195 The Marijuana Policy Project 
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surmised that the legislation’s biggest flaw was appointing the Department of 
Consumer Affairs as the department to oversee marijuana regulation, since the 
department never had any stake in the legislation’s outcome.196 Alternatively, 
California NORML theorized that the lifetime ban on all individuals who had any 
prior drug trafficking felonies was the “poison clause” that kept the bill from 
passing.197 Another offered reason boils down to SB 1262’s price tag—estimated 
at $20 million.198  
Perhaps the biggest qualm when it came to turning SB 1262 into law was the 
provision that required local governments to comply with testing, distribution, 
and security measures.199 In spite of these contentions, SB 1262 showed how it is 
possible to regulate the industry and future bill proposals will unquestionably 
incorporate many concepts from the stalled bill.200 However, both of SB 1262’s 
authors served their final terms in 2014 and statewide initiatives legalizing 
marijuana are likely to reach the ballot in 2016, leaving the future of medical 
marijuana uncertain.201 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Affordable Care Act, the National Response Plan, and the Great 
Recession of 2008 all provide examples of how crucial implementing and 
enforcing regulatory frameworks are for successful government administration.202 
With a growing marijuana industry, SB 1262’s implementation of a regulatory 
scheme could have been just what the doctor ordered—a roadmap for those 
within the industry, law enforcement, and all levels of government.203  
As with any new regulation, SB 1262 was not without its issues, but it 
nonetheless shed light on how important it is for law enforcement and marijuana 
advocates to work together to regulate all levels of marijuana commerce.204 
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Future proposals will not only have other states’ marijuana regulations as 
examples, but will also have SB 1262 as a guideline for anticipating problems 
that this thoughtful legislation encountered.205 Although California will never 
know if SB 1262 would have been successful, the state will inevitably see future 
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